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The Eurozenship debate has generated a wealth of ideas and interesting proposals.
Both Willem and Liav have summarised them wonderfully and thus there is little to
be gained from reiterating the contributors’ various positions here. What I would like
to do in this brief rejoinder is to consider, and reflect on, four main themes that have
emerged in the critiques of my Eurozenship proposal.
Mushroom reasoning or mushrooming historico-
political time?
I read the contributions to the debate during a brief trip to Frankfurt (Oder) a couple
of weeks ago. Walking along the bridge connecting two cities and two countries
(i.e., Germany and Poland), being on the ‘border’ without being stopped by a border
guard and walking leisurely without seeing either a wall or a fence or barbed wire
sharpens one’s view of historical time. Reinhart Koselleck’s once wrote ‘there
is no history which could be constituted independently of the experiences and
expectations of active human agents.’ Who could have expected the human exodus
from DDR and the reunification of Germany? Had anyone predicted the collapse of
Tito’s Yugoslavia – a past mentioned in Jelena’s introduction? Had Mr Gove and
Mr Johnson, key architects of the British ‘Leave the EU’ campaign, predicted the
outcome of the EU membership referendum of 23 June 2016? The answer to the
above questions is a negative one.
The historico-political field is full of ‘mushrooms emerging from the earth’
unexpectedly. But it is also cultivated and nurtured by the expectations, struggles,
ideas for reform and actions of human beings. ‘Mushroom reasoning’, which Richard
is so keen to criticise, necessarily accompanies ‘mushrooming politics’ and, thus,
‘mushrooming history’. At the same time, the latter cannot be divorced from ordinary
human beings’ convictions that the suffering inflicted on them by arbitrary will, power,
wealth, prejudice, dogma or ideology is unnecessary and that their future does not
have to resemble the present or the past. The European unification process has
solidified this realisation.
Seeing like a state?
Not everything begins with states. Richard sees the EU ‘as the creature of the
contracting states’, a system that ‘operates through their sovereign systems’
and as an order based on reciprocity. I do not share such views. I find it almost
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impossible to bracket the role of social mobilisation and collective action (e.g.,
proto-federalist and federalist movements, European unification initiatives, peace
movements, anti-fascist mobilisation and so on), non-state actors and of what I
call subversive memories of wars, atrocities and destruction of life in the European
integration process. Nor do I subscribe to the view that the EU legal order is based
on reciprocity, as Richard states, or on pooled sovereignty, as Rainer argues, – the
Court of Justice has categorically denied this throughout the decades.
In addition, I do not agree with Richard’s contention that ‘the related and most valued
rights [of EU Citizenship] are, for the most part, not rights that are offered by EU
institutions – the notable exception being the right to vote in European Parliament
elections- but rights that are upheld by the constituent states’. EU citizenship tights
are upheld by the Member States precisely because they are provided by EU
institutions and enforcement proceedings will follow if the Member States breach
their obligations under EU law. Dimitris has eloquently expressed this. He has
argued that a republican democratic account would support the grant of voting
rights at EP elections to all members of ‘the public’, irrespective of their nationality.
Oliver fully shares this point of view and has provided good justifications for this.
Democracy is closer to a republican Europe of peoples rather than a republican
Europe of states.
Rainer argues that this can be achieved by national citizenship reform and greater
inclusivity in national arenas. No one would object to this; there is no disagreement
among the participants here. Jean-Thomas’s contribution complements this position
by being explicit on the desirable national citizenship reforms; namely, expanding
municipal franchise to all residents in all Member States and limiting the Member
States’ power to ‘super-or-down size the European citizenry’ in violation of EU law.
However, the issue at stake is that, given that such reforms at national level have not
taken place for years and seem unlikely to take place in the near future, why should
we not consider making EU citizenship more inclusive and responsive to the needs
of Europe’s residents?
Rainer’s response is that this cannot be done because the ‘two levels of government
are constitutionally intertwined’. But why should this constitutional fact lead us to
believe that citizenship at one level must be derived exclusively from citizenship
at the other level? After all, we know that such a derivation is not prescribed in a
deterministic way; it is a ‘historically preferred’ derivation, that is, it was politically
agreed in the 1960s with respect to the beneficiaries of free movement and
residence. It has been sedimented in law since then. But political choices are
changeable and ‘contingent combinations’ are alterable. Of course, the Member
States would object that the proposed disentanglement of citizenships would
interfere with their doctrines of national sovereignty and their juridico-political
choices, as Daniel and Eva wonderfully show with respect to Denmark and
Germany, respectively, and Jelena remarks with respect to divergent definitions of
residence. In response, Jules notes the didactic role of history in his conclusion;
there is a historical precedent and therefore ‘it is worth giving an autonomous EU
citizenship a try’ (Jules Lepoutre) or welcoming ‘a leap of faith’ (Oliver Garner).
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Either national citizenship or Eurozenship?
My argument for Eurozenship did not, and could not, map out all possible reforms
which could be taken at national or EU levels. Nor was my intention to argue that a
reconstruction of EU citizenship along the lines I proposed would solve all problems.
The contributors to this debate outlined a number of reforms, while Willem makes
a convincing case for the simultaneous strengthening of citizenship at both levels. I
fully agree with Willem and have consistently defended reforms in the material scope
of EU citizenship and a social citizenship in the EU for more than two decades. In
this forum I only reflected on one question: ‘who should be a citizen of the European
Union?’. I did not focus on the rights EU citizens ought to have or how national
citizenship could become less restrictive. I agree with both Willem and Liav that a
reconstruction of EU citizenship would be inherently productive if it gained support
from a wide range of actors, gave expression to real ties of social solidarity and
changed power imbalances and ideological interests. EU citizenship reform is not a
matter of ‘either/or’ in the same way that one cannot make a convincing case about
democratic deficits in the EU without addressing democratic deficits in the Member
States and their role in generating democratic deficits in the EU.
On institutional change, Brexit and emancipation
It is true that the character, pace and direction of institutional change in this domain
will not be determined by our contributions to this debate. Such an expectation would
not be realistic. And although the intellectual temper of the present era counsels
against radicalism and our life and mind are saturated with the Brexit discourse and
politics, we should not forget that democracy at all levels is essentially about the
quality of human experience and the richness of associated life. Brexit has lessened
the quality of both and thus it can hardly function as a compass for future reforms.
Unlike Liav, I am rather hesitant to conclude that it can serve ‘Europe’s constitutional
moment to reform its citizenship regimes’. Brexit has highlighted the mistakes in
constructing an equivalence among demagogy, demography (that is, the aggregation
of votes) and democracy and in dividing deeply communities and societies at all
levels of governance. The spirit of emancipated, internationalist democracy and
human solidarity is steady blowing and must be galvanised for it is this spirit that
turns walls of all sorts, which narrow morality and human empathy, into bridges, like
the bridge I walked on a couple of weeks ago in Frankfurt (Oder).
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